It is now clear that holding European government debt
poses more dangers than previously thought. The collective action of Europe can
influence all the national bond markets introducing a new type of risk the “Eurocouncil bond risk”. Thus a nation’s
government bonds in some ways have become Eurobonds. This became apparent
following the Greek PSI that used EU’s article 9 of 593/2008[i] .
Now the Eurogroup wants to buy back 30 or more billions of Greek bonds without
moving the market. The Greeks say that the appetite increases as you start
eating. Europe’s politicians started the process of passing the blame to
everyone else but themselves and they like it. One should expect more meddling
and messing.
According to the decision taken by the Eurogroup on
Greece, Europe and the IMF would decide on the 13th of December on
the disbursement of the 43.7billion. Apparently, Eurogroup’s approval hinges
firstly on the approval of the national parliaments but more importantly on a
“review of the outcome of a possible debt by back by Greece”. Although we would
be very surprised if the money is not given the debt buy-back is riskier for
many reasons.
1.
Although there is no condition on
the buyback to be voluntary or coercive, one has to note that, these post PSI
bonds are under English law and as such, Greece cannot play the same trick they
used for the PSI. In other words Greece cannot force bondholders to sell at a
particular price. So there has to be an agreement. Unless Greece threatens
bondholders with a moratorium and default few independently minded bondholders
would sell at the price of 28% (price of series to 2042 before the decision)
when the market ticks higher. The only other persuasive argument would be for
European finance ministers and in particular for the Greek one to arm-twist
their banks and in particular the Greek banks into selling their holdings at
this price. In this case the effective loss on the original Greek bonds would
approach 80%. This is a massive haircut. Nice trade if you can do it even nicer
if you can appeal to the noble feelings of self-sacrifice.
2.
The buy-back is going to be
conducted by Greece. This is a grey area as Greece currently does not have the
necessary funds to complete such a purchase. An alternative would be for EFSF
to issue bonds and the proceeds to be used for the buyback. This is a rather
long process. The other way would be to exchange the Greek GGB with T-bills
issued either by the EFSF (or the Greek version of it) or even by new short
term notes issued by Greece with a guarantee attached. Of course Greece can use
other means, like de-listing or other poison pills to “gently persuade”
bondholders to sell but we doubt if there is enough preparation or time to
start such a process/dialogue.
3.
If the buy-back is done by one
entity then theoretically they could form a necessary majority to activate once
more the Collective Action Clauses and force any hold outs into this debt swap
or sellback. However, that entity cannot be Greece as this is not allowed.
Furthermore, it would be seen as a dirty trick to cheat investors. This would
probably be successfully contested in the English courts in light of the recent
decision on Anglo.
4.
The original proposal also includes
the buyback of the PSI hold outs but even if it happens the benefits would be
minimal as there is only 3-4billion still outstanding.
In
conclusion, the debt by back would probably be done on the Greek bondholders
(banks, funds etc) and few European bondholders amenable to altruistic
arguments by their political masters. How many bonds can be restructured this
way? Counting only the Greek holdings a figure close to 25-30billion is doable.
This would represent a saving of 17-20billion on the national debt. One
question that remains is where these bonds are marked by the Greek banks. If
Greek banks marked to market their nGGB (new GGB) holdings then they would
suffer no additional losses due to this. If on the other hand they have them
booked at Par then all the benefits would be negated by the increase in capital
injection by the state. As for the Greek pension funds, their massive losses
and funding gaps do not count in the Greek debt. So it is a free raid on the
future pension.
Once more
the European governments are trying to mess with the functioning of the bond
market. This is a far stronger omen than anything else on what is going to
happen to other government bond markets like Spain’s, Portugal’s, Italy’s and
perhaps even France’s. L'État, c'est moi as Lagarde would have said if she
lived at the time of Louis LIV.
[i] Article 9.
593/EU.Overriding mandatory
provisions are provisions the respect for which is regarded as crucial by a
country for safeguarding its public interests, such as its political, social or
economic organisation, to such an extent that they are applicable to any
situation falling within their scope, irrespective of the law otherwise
applicable to the contract under this Regulation. 2. Nothing in this Regulation
shall restrict the application of
the overriding
mandatory provisions of the law of the forum.
